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Laos is a poor country located in Indochinese peninsula who has been 
dependent on foreign aid since its rough independency in 1945 and 
Japan has been providing aid to Laos since late 1950s and become the 
biggest donor since 2000. This paper reviews the history of foreign aid 
from Japan to Laos. During late 1970s and early 1980s, Laos witnessed 
the huge deduction of foreign aid from Japan as well as from other 
donors. The paper, so that, focuses on finding the main cause of this 
decline. Main variables are explored: Japanese aid policy, Japan-Lao 
economic and politic ties, and the communist influence in Laos. The 
economic motive of Japan’s aid is emphasized as the first assumption in 
the study. The paper found out that the main reason for the aid 
deduction was from the politic-security as Japan concerned more about 
the security within Laos and its neighbors. The socialist movement of 
Lao government and the huge influence from communist Vietnam and 
Soviet bloc in late 1970s had posed uncertainty to Lao economy, 
democracy, human rights and diplomatic relationship with its regional 
states. It learns that the economic ties of the two countries is so weak 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Lao PDR (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) or Laos is a land-locked 
country located in the Southeast Asia sharing border with China, Burma, 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Laos is one of the poorest countries who got 
independence in late 1975. Its GDP per capita was around US$ 300 in 
2000, and the country is placed at the category of the Least Develop 
Country in the World Bank list. Being one of the poorest and least 
developed countries in Southeast Asia, Lao PDR has been trying its 
best to achieve its national development plan whose priority goal is to 
get rid of LDC status by 2020. To achieve MDG and SDG as well as 
eradicate poverty from the country, Laos has focused on the 
development of its economic as the main of theme of its mechanism as 
addressed in its “8th National Socio-Economic Development Plan 
2016-2020”. The country has liberated its market more to the world 
with lesser regulation of the state. Private sectors have more freedoms. 
One of the policies to gain more financial source is to attract more 
foreign direct investments and to seek for more foreign aid. 
To be dependent on foreign aid is not new agenda to Laos. Instead, it 
has been associated firmly with the state since late 19th century. 
Foreign aid contributed to Laos can be tracked from 1950s. Laos has 
been obviously dependent on foreign aid from its pre and post-
independence to present days. The country started its independency 
with very poor economy status that had been damaged as a victim of 
colonization and wars until 1975. Since the country gained its 
independence through the leader of Communist, it had applied its 




Mechanism (NEM ① ) has been introduced and implemented since in 
1986, where the GDP per capita was almost 150 USD, the country 
opened and attracted more foreign investment and assistance. Since 
then, Lao economy got better but in slow pace. Foreign aid has been 
one of the main country’s financial supports. Foreign aid statistic in 
2000 was around US$ 237 million and GDP per capita was around 300 
USD. The foreign aid trend has been on fluctuating rise and reached 
almost $500 million in 2014 of which the GDP per capita was around 
1,700 USD. Due to the country’s trade deficit, the country still needs 
more external financial assistance to balance its finance. The country, 
therefore, goes on its search for more foreign assistance regardless of 
critique on foreign assistance which some scholars claim that most of 
the aid was in favor of donors’ interest or strategy. Those kind of aid 
emphasized donors’ benefits rather than recipient development.  
The main donors to Laos are those from the Western countries like 
France, Germany and Switzerland, one from Oseania; Australia and the 
only one from Asian continent is Japan. According to the volume of aid 
flow among DAC donors, Japan has been the largest donor to the world 
since late 1990s. And to Laos, its aid proportion has covered 
approximately one third of overall DAC donor since 2000 making Japan 
the biggest donor to the country. Furthermore, Japanese aid to Laos 
has long history back to the late 1950s when their mutual diplomatic 
relation was established in 1955. With regard to the negative-historic 
legacy of the invasion of Japanese empire to Laos during 1945, Japan 
had provided economic assistance for recalling normalization 
relationship with Laos as concluded in the San Francisco Treaty 1951. 
In this treaty, Japan agreed to pay reparation for the victims of World 
War2. 
                                            
① NEM: the transition from socialist to capitalist economy of Laos, more 




This long and large assistance has shown the importance of Japanese 
ODA to Laos. However, this phenomenon may raise two interesting 
aspects among scholars. First, it has indicated how much Laos is 
dependent on foreign aid and this would not be a sustainable 
development. Secondly, how much is the aid effective is deserved to be 
considered. With the terms of aid effectiveness, two things to be 
careful looked at. One is recipient engagement of the aid and the other 
is the main purpose of the donor. As many has critiqued the Japanese 
aid as strategic interest more than humanitarian aid, this may pose 
hindrance to the goals of Lao government in pursuing its economic 
development and eradicate itself from LDCs. This concern has raised 
an interest of a revision of study on Japanese ODA to Laos. Even 
though, there has been a lot of paper analyzing Japanese foreign 
assistance, but most of them do not touch on single recipient case like 
Laos as much as it supposed to be, according to its aid’s engagement in 
Laos. This paper, so that, contributes to the revision of overall Japan’s 
foreign aid to Laos since their diplomatic establishment to present. The 
main content of the paper focused on the period of the aid flow 
deduction during its early independency.  
1.2. Purpose of Research 
This paper reviews the history of Japan’s ODA to Laos since 1950s to 
present. It mainly tracks the aid flow: the volume of aid contributed to 
Laos. The timeline is divided into three periods, 1950s-1975, 1975-
1992 and 1992-2015. The first period is explored roughly the aid 
volume which was originated from economic aid to Laos during Japan’s 
World War II reparation to Southeast Asia countries. Once, Laos had 
witnessed a critical juncture of aid deduction during 1975-1992. At the 
period, the volume of foreign aid from all DAC donors to Lao had 
sharply declined, as well as the aid from Japan. This coincident drop of 




This paper is mainly trying to explain the causes for that incident. 
Finally, this paper looks at the aid flow: aid volume and sectors focus 
of the aid during post-cold war to present. 
Figure 1: ODA to Laos 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
The answers to the causes of the aid flow deduction would make a lot 
contribution to the donor, recipient and other organizations. For Laos, 
this result would help shape its international policy especially when it 
continues seeking further foreign assistance from Japan and other 
donors. This would also be tangible argument referring the main 





Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The interests in studying bilateral foreign aid to small countries seems 
to be so limited as shown in the existing literature that not many 
papers analyzed the case of small recipients. Laos is one of those who 
need more attention from scholars. Laos has been a small recipient of 
foreign aid since its independence to present. There has been a lot of 
research on the ODA to Laos. Unfortunately, the area of bilateral donor 
aid to a single recipient, Japan’s foreign aid to Laos, needs more 
attention. Therefore, this review could address some available 
research papers on Japanese aid to Laos. Other part of the review 
looks at literature of Japanese aid’s motivation to Asia. Finally, it 
reviews how other scholars explore the cause of aid flow reduction 
from donors like Japan and other major donors. It explains why foreign 
aid is cut or reduced.  
2.1. Japanese Foreign Aid  
Cooray and Shahiduzzaman (2004) studied the determinant of Japanese 
aid allocation. They found out that during 1970s-80s, Japanese ODA 
was motivated by self-economic and political & security concerns. 
During 1973, Japan faced oil embargo from OPEC, so she had to 
redesign her aid policy to gain supply from other countries outside Asia. 
And with the pressure from Korean peninsula tension, the relationship 
of Japan, US, China and the influence of Soviet in Asia, Japan had to 
adapt foreign policy to gain the security of the country and politic 
relations. Moreover, Japan sees ASEAN as the important roots of her 
economic stability. Grant and Jijman (1997) also concluded that the 
motivation of Japan’s foreign aid to Asia Pacific in early cold war 
period was to expand its economics and commerce. However, in late 




cooperation, merging between realism to liberalism. In 1995, Takagi 
studied Japanese Official Aid Flow and how she turned from recipient in 
1945 to top donor. The research concluded that the initial goal of 
Japan’s aid early programs was economics as promoting its firms’ 
export, ensuring its investment in abroad and securing stable supply of 
natural materials. The motives changed to new goals currently in 1989 
as in support to: 1 the status of Japan as an economic superpower, 2 
the status of the world largest creditor and surplus country, 3 its 
economic dependence on other countries, 4 the dedication to peace, 5 
its status as the only non-Western developed country. 
Nam Pan conducted a research on Japanese ODA to Asian countries 
after the Cold War focusing on Myanmar in comparison with Cambodia, 
Vietnam and Laos since 2000. The research identified the main 
motivations for Japan in giving aid to those countries. For Laos, Japan 
supported the integration of Laos into regional and global economy by 
supporting the self-help system of Laos in eradicating poverty, human 
resource development and sustainable economic growth. Trinidad 
(2007) investigated the change of Japanese aid in response to the 
domestic and international trend after the cold war focusing on 
Southeast Asian countries. Japan faced the critiques on its development 
assistance disbursement whether to gain or to spend. The paper infers 
that it is not simply to conclude that Japan’s ODA allocation is for its 
own interest. Both the internal and external influences have shaped the 
trend of her aid. Japan increased grant to the region in previous 
decades. The recent increase in ODA disbursement to Laos and 
Myanmar is a good example of her egoistic aid. The 1990s marked the 
point that Japanese aid stayed at the crossroad, Japan considers both 




There was a Country Assistance Evaluation of Laos Summary in 2005②. 
The main objective of the report is to provide the review on the 
Japanese ODA policy to Laos. The evaluation of Japanese ODA to Laos 
was conducted in 2004 and 2014. For the report in 2004, it found out 
that Lao national policy on foreign aid was consistent with Japanese 
ODA policy. It was on the track of Lao government’s development plan 
and strategy. It can be seen that Japan has been contributing sufficient 
and efficient aid to the need of Laos. Apart from the Asian crisis, many 
donors have dropt their aid while Japan did not. However, there were 
some constrains to efficiency of the aid. The aim and purpose of 
Japanese aid has not been made clear enough that Lao government 
could fully implement it in its primary sectors. The report in 2014 
found that the relevant of the policies between both donor and recipient 
is very high. The result of aid contribution also was concluded very 
high efficient. Lastly, the Japanese foreign assistant policy has been 
carried out properly by related agency or implementers. 
2.2. The Causes of Deduction in Foreign Aid 
Dang et al (2013) investigated the causes of the fall in international aid. 
They found that internal factors like financial crisis and economic 
condition of donors affect the aid flow. Banking crisis in donor 
countries is linked to the substantial reduction of the aid. The reason 
for that is apart from the fall in donors’ GDP, the bank crisis poses high 
cost of crisis and the aftermath of debt in the following years. The aid 
                                            
② Country assistance evaluation is a report conducted by external advisory 
meeting on ODA evaluation, which is an informal advisory body of director-
general of economic cooperation bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan. The report conducted in every 10 years to evaluate Japanese 
development assistance to individual recipient. Since there has been a 
requirement for effective and efficient performance of Japan’s ODA implication, 
the MOFA conducts the reports on this evaluation for two main objectives from 
their policy level as to support the implementation and management of ODA and 





is assumed to drop by 28 percent of each affected donor. Frot (2009) 
tested if the financial crisis has impact on aid flow. The research used 
two approaches, vector auto-regression and by comparison between 
past aid flow of donors who experienced financial crisis with donors 
who did not. It turned out that the crisis did not only reduce the aid 
budget but also change the aid trend. Moreover, the regression 
significantly showed that long-term drops in GDP by 1 percent posed 
negative effect as the reduction in aid budget by as much as 8 percent. 
There was a research on rise and fall of foreign aid conducted by 
Browne in 1997. It unveiled that the major cause of reduction in aid 
budget of many donors was related to tightening implication of fiscal 
constrain.  
Viksnins (1975) studied the fall in US aid. The paper sees the sharp 
decline of American foreign aid during 1960s to 1970s. The paper 
claims there are two reasons for that fall. One is the negative opinion 
of the tax payers, American people, when they learnt the downturn in 
US influence in Southeast Asia and the rise of communism when the 
communist fighters won their wars in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 
early 1970s. Those people saw the aid was less effective in achieving 
US’s goals. The other reason was the US economy witnessed recession 
during that period making constrain in aid budget. Lis (2014) used panel 
of countries to identify the net effect of arm conflict and terrorism, 
domestic and international, to foreign aid receipt. The result shows that 
foreign aid amount, bilateral and multilateral, is to be reduced by the 
effect of arm conflict incident. On the contrary, the volume especially 
bilateral aid tends to increase in respond to the terrorist activations. 
This incident is consistent with the assumption that the aid is given 





2.3. Politic Ideology and Aid  
Boschini & Olofsgård (2007) examined whether the reduction of foreign 
aid during 1990s was due to the end of Cold War. They applied the 
dynamic econometrics specification of 17 donors in the period of 1970-
1997. The study was concluded that the disbursement of foreign aid 
during the Cold War was correlated with military expenditure of the 
former Eastern bloc countries and during 1990s the aid flow had been 
reduced as the matter of the degradation in aid motivation among 
donors. Stuart-Fox (1998) studied the connection between communist 
bloc countries: Laos and Vietnam. Vietnam gained influence in Laos 
formally from late 1970s which was the time of Cold War contestation 
and US was supporting the Royal Lao Government in fighting against 
communist rival. The research also partially found that the influence 
posed at least two internal effects to Laos namely economics and 
politics. In terms of economic, the relationship had pushed most foreign 
aid from Laos resulting in the sharp reduction of Western aid that Laos 
used to receive. According to David Beim, foreign aid can make 
influences on 4 areas to donor: 
1. promote good will and solidify friendly relations, 
2. make the recipient country dependent upon the donor, 
3. cultivate a natural ideological ally over the long run,   
4. obtain military advantages. 
When Japan, as well as other Western donors, learned the big influence 
that Vietnam and Soviet can make on Laos, Japan could expect that 
their aid could make minor or no influence on communist regime. The 
strong communism in Lao government is against their aid strategy. As a 
result, we can conclude that they had reduced or withdrawn their 
assistance to Laos. This factor is logical the assumption that the 
communist move in Laos had pushed Western donor away from Lao 




Chapter 3. Methodology 
This is a qualitative analysis that reviews and describes Japan’s 
bilateral foreign aid to Laos since their diplomatic relationship was 
established in 1955 to present days. The timeline is divided into three 
periods according to the trend of the aid flow and the major politic 
movements of Laos and the world: 1950s-1975, 1975-1992 and 1992-
2015. In the first period, this paper explores eco-political environments 
of Laos that attracted foreign aid to Laos. Aid from Japan and other 
major donors is explored focusing on volume and sector contribution. 
Since the country witnessed the critical drop of foreign aid during the 
early aftermath Lao independence in 1975, the second period, the 
paper tries to find the answers for the causes of aid reduction. So the 
main contribution of this paper is devoted to this period when the aid 
volume dropped to its lowest of each donor at the same year 1980. To 
find out the causes of the deduction, the literature review has provided 
some clues for this paper to apply in. The third period of timeline 
addresses the volume and sector contribution of aid.   
To frame the area of analysis in this paper, aid motive is the core part 
to be explored. The tiring debate on the main motives in giving aid has 
given us skeptical finding of foreign aid allocation among egoistic and 
altruist donors. In our general perception as well as OECD view, the 
practice of aid giving should be based on donor’s altruism. However, in 
practice, it sometimes initiates from our egoism and some donors view 
foreign aid as an indirect investment. According to Riddell’s book“Does 
Foreign Aid Really Work?”, published in 2008, six clusters of aid 
motives have been identified according to the practice of aid allocation 
from the past. Foreign aid is for (1) showing solidarity, (2) maintaining 
historical ties, (3) paving way for donor economic extension, (4) 




their goals, and (6) securing political stability. Overall, the major 
donors’ motives in giving aid can be categorized into three big groups: 
Figure 2: The Category of Aid Motivation 
Humanitarian Motive Politic-Security 
Motive 
Economic Motive 
Sweden US Japan 
Denmark France  New Zealand  
Norway United Kingdom Australia 
Netherland Portugal  
Finland Spain  
Source: Riddell (2007) 
According to the literature reviews, the motivations of donor are 
important factor that drive the trend of the aid flow. For Japan, many 
scholars have pointed out that its main motivation in its early aid 
programs, during 1960s-1970s, was economic self-interest and then 
the motivation has moved to politic-security interest in balance with 
economic desire. Hans Morganthau’s “A Political Theory of Foreign 
Aid” in 1962 is another good work contending the motives of foreign 
aid. This theory classified the 6 types of foreign aid and foreign aid for 
economic development is one of those which Morganthau emphasized 
how the foreign aid was used by major donors like US and Japan to 
boost economic of recipients as well as donors’ economy. Therefore, 
this paper will look at Japanese aid through the lens of economic 
motives. That is the first assumption. 
However, some scholars, from the literature reviews, have claimed that 
the motive of Japanese foreign aid has merged from single economic 
self-interest to politic-security base. They claim Japan takes recipient 
needs into account more and makes balance with its own aid desire. 




example in addressing the motives of Japan. This suspension was a 
protest in response to the Tiananmen and nuclear test of China’s 
government. The protest signals that Japan concerns about politic-
security in the region more. This aspect of aid giving is deserved to be 
taken into account of this study. This paper, so that, also explores 
whether that kind of Japanese motive was applied to Laos. This is a 
second assumption.   
To prove those two assumptions, the paper looks at the relations of the 
Japanese economics to Laos. According to the origin of Japan aid to 
Laos which was economic assistance, the trade between them must be 
explored. Japan export-import to Laos is a good indicator for this 
motivation. The denser trade volume can refer to the more links to the 
aid. Moreover, Japan FDI is one more important factor to be taken into 
account as Japan outbound FDI is very well recognized in the Asian 
countries. 
In addition, it also considers the financial status of Japan if there were 
any financial constraint during that period, as referred in the literature 
review that donor finance can affect its budget aid. Once the oil crisis 
hit many countries in 1973 and 1979, Japan also was severely affected 
as Japan is one of the most energy-imported countries.  But, this 
factor can be proved to have no link to the Japanese aid deduction. 
Once we compare its aid disbursement to the world or LDCs in the 
same period of aid flow deduction in Laos, the trend of Japan aid flow 
did not on the slop, on the contrary, it was on the rise. This can refer 
that Japanese aid budget was not affected by the oil crisis or other 






Figure 3: Japanese ODA to the world 
Source: OECD (2017) 
In terms security, the issue to be considered is political-security 
aspect, the influence of regional situation: Southeast Asia and the Cold 
War to Laos. The communist bloc struggle posed some degree of 
influence to the flow of Japanese aid. Then Japan’s aid motivation in 
Southeast Asia sifted to focus on regional security. Thus, the deduction 
of its aid could be as an implication of protesting the influencing of 
socialist countries in Laos namely Vietnam and Soviet Union. In late 
1970s, most Western donors like United Kingdom, France, US, 
Germany and Australia began to reduce their aid and the aid dropped to 
the lowest point in 1980. The main reason for this incident was 
assumed to be the consequence of communist movement and influence 
in Laos. Therefore, this paper tries to prove this assumption. 
The rest of the paper, the last phase of the timeline, it reviews the aid 
flow as if the there are some characteristics of Japanese aid. This 
review paper is based on and adapted from“DAC Peer Reviews of 
Japan 2010”. This peer review was conducted by OECD DAC in 2011. 
The DAC periodically reviews the individual development co-operation 
effort of DAC members. The review conducts every 4 or 5 years to 




OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate provides is responsible 
for providing analysis support and enhance developing and maintaining 
the conceptual framework of each single peer review. For this review, 
it focuses on characteristic of Japanese aid contribute to all recipients 
from 2006-2010. This paper has applied this DAC review to be as the 
pattern with some adaptation for the appropriate of its study’s purpose. 
For example; this paper focuses on the aid flow and sector contribution.  
Since historical information is rare and some is unaffordable, the main 
sources of this study are derived from scholar’s papers. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
provided main statistics of the aid disbursement. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provides the 
essential policy source. Other sources are from Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Laos, Vietnam and other official and reputed websites.  
The international relation theory applied in this writing is realist theory. 
As mentioned above, the practice of aid allocation by Japan is 
academically considered as for self-interest. Realist theory can explain 
well why one state provides aid to other states. As Han Morganthaus 
explained in his scholar work on the theory of international relations, 
the theory contains three key assumptions. One, states are the key unit 
of action. Two, they seek power, either as an end of itself or as a mean 
to other end, like zero-sum game. Three, they behave in the ways that 
are rational and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in reasoning 
terms. These assumptions can address that the behavior of Japan in 
supporting aid to other governments is originated from Japan’s needs, 
nobody can force Japan to give aid. Furthermore, Japan is the main 
actor who designs its own contribution of its aid. The motivation of 
Japan’s contribution is rational and understandable as Japan does this 




of Japan after WW2 leaves Japan no choice but to accelerate it growth 





Chapter 4. The Pouring of Foreign Aid 
(1950s-1975) 
As mentioned in the methodology section about the timeline of the 
review, from late 1950s to 1975 is the first period of study in this 
paper that foreign aid is tracked.  
4.1. Laos and Foreign Aid in Delivery 
The kingdom of Laos had been colonized by France from 1893-1945. 
The invasion of Japanese in 1945 had released Laos from the French 
colonization and occupied Laos instead. The occupation lasted for a 
while before its surrender of WW2. France returned to invade Laos 
again in late 1946. Laos then struggled to flee itself from France’s 
intervention till 1954 when the Geneva conference took place in 
Switzerland. The conference approved “Geneva Accords ③ ” to end 
wars in Indochina. The Geneva Accords ordered all foreign military to 
leave the territory of the Lao Kingdom. After all foreign troop left Laos, 
the national government was supposed to be set up. At that time, the 
kingdom had internal conflict of seizing legitimate power between two 
groups. There was a group, The Pathet Lao④, who was seeking to 
eliminate the monarchy system of the kingdom. Pathet Lao is a 
communist activator who originated from the communist group in 
Vietnam in late 1930s and they supported each other ever since. 
                                            
③ There was a conference held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1954, called Geneva 
Conference, to handle critical issues of Korean War and the hostile in Indochina 
peninsular. The four main actors attended: Soviet Union, China, United States 
and United Kingdom, and other related country representatives. Geneva 
Accords was an agreement in the conference that set an independent status of 
Vietnam, Kingdom of Cambodian and Kingdom of Laos.  All the outsider troops 
had to leave the countries. 
④ Pathet Las (or Land of Laos) was a communist group formed in early 1950s 
who is Laotian and similar to Vietnamese Viet Cong and Cambodia’s Khmer 
Rouge. Pathet Lao was led by Prince Souphanouvong in a movement against 




Another group was Royal Lao Government⑤ (RLG) who was organized 
by the Kingdom of Laos in 1947. RLG was anti-communist government 
controlling the main city of Laos and preserving its legitimacy against 
rebellion like communist Pathet Lao. This race between two groups had 
been initially ragging since the French colonization period.  
So when the independent time came in 1954, Laos was about to govern 
itself. The general election was held to solve this challenge under the 
supervision of an International Commission for Supervision and Control 
(ICSC) ⑥  established by Geneva Conference. During this approach, 
foreign aid emerged as offerings to support both sides in national 
unification campaign. Unfortunately, Pathet Lao refused to join the 
election. Many negotiations were made to unite the two, but failed. 
Since this divergent incident, the foreign aid was also determined to 
either RLG or Pathet Lao. Most donors to Laos at that time were 
Western donors who were anti-communism so most of their aid was 
provided to RLG. US was the main donor. US aid had been given to 
Laos since 1955, its grant aid was around US$ 33 million and in the 
following year US$ 53 million and US$ 48 million (Gilkey, 1958). The 
aid was mostly cash grant to support military expense of RLG. The big 
amount of American aid was undoubtedly on the purpose of maintaining 
the expansion of communist influence in Laos and Laos at that time was 
so prone to be influenced by its communist neighbor, China leading by 
Mao Zedong and was expanding more power in the region. 
Politic security is not the only factor attracting foreign aid to Laos. 
Other components making Laos, at that time, much dependent on aid 
were national economic and social constrains. Apart from the sufficient 
                                            
⑤ RLG was founded in 1947 as a ruling authority in the Kingdom of Laos until 
Pathet Lao took over the country in1975. 
⑥ A commission set by the Geneva Accord 1954 to help Laos in organizing its 





food from their farming, the peasants whose proportion was almost 
95 % of the Lao population, suffered from health issue. Only half of 
new born babies could live till the age of ten. The living income was 
estimated at around US$ 50 annually which was the lowest in Asia. 
Literacy rate was also the lowest at about 15%. There was no health 
service, no telephone calls. Electricians or plumbers were difficult to 
find. The country had only one newsletter written in French and Lao, 
running by the government. The communication was far difficult since 
there was no single railroad to link people and trade. No bridge was 
built to cross the Mekong River which is the biggest and longest river 
lying from the north to the south parts of Laos. No foreign direct 
investment, or event from American or French enterprise, took place in 
this land. Chinese community, around 30.00 to 40.000 people living in 
Laos, manipulated all the retail trade and local finance service. No 
direct tax applied to the peasants but there was nominal income tax. 
Main source of government income was from custom duty followed by 
foreign aid. The annual revenue from custom duty was US$ 12 million. 
Unfortunately, the income could not raise the net income of the nation 
since it was spent on its import bill. There was no balance of payment 
as the export of raw material was overwhelmed by the huge amount of 
import. The recorded of export used to be around US$ 2 million per 
annum during French protectorate. But in late 1950s, the figure was 
only US$ 500.000. Lao production was aiming at local consumption. 
There was glutinous rice, salt, fruit, cotton, tobacco, potatoes, peanuts 
and coffee. There was plenty of land to be utilized but only 8 percent 
was cultivated. There was no official prohibition if any Laotian wanted 
to invest in the land. It was so astonished that the land was not 
occupied by the Chinese residents but only some Laotian farmers. The 
government so that could exploit the land as much as if they wanted. 
Overall, these social, economic and political conditions had attracted 




the main donor.    
Apart from US aid disbursement, Laos also received foreign aid from 
other countries and international organizations. Since 1955, Laos 
received French aid amounting of around seven million dollars as being 
a member of French Union⑦. The aid was aiming to be spent on road, 
airfields and educational facility maintenance. Laos also received some 
aid from United Nations and Colombo Plan⑧. Some doctors and nurses 
were sent to the critical infected areas of Laos in providing health 
service. There were from the “Operation Brotherhood, supported by 
International Junior Chamber of Commerce.   
1960s, foreign economic aid had become fundamental for RLG in terms 
of securing monetary stability and effectiveness of national 
development programs. Apart from aid supported by Foreign Exchange 
Operate Fund in coping inflation trend, other foreign aid was given for 
supplying essential imports and for operating special projects. From 
1965-69, the aid for importing products had decreased fundamentally 
from equivalent of US$ 81 million to US$ 2.5 million and the United 
State was the only one left who supported the commodity import 
program. Australian, France, United Kingdom (UK), Japan and US were 
the main donors during that time while West German, Thailand, India, 
Canada, United Nation had been also important donors. Netherland, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Denmark and Belgium had been participating in 
social and economic development programs. Some significant amount of 
                                            
⑦ French Union is a political identity created in 1946 in replace of French 
Colonial Empire by the Forth Constitution of the Forth French Republic.  
⑧ Colombo Plan is one of the oldest international organization established in 
1950. The organization was founded on purposes of economic cooperation and 
social development among the countries in Asian and Pacific. Australia, Sri 
Lanka, United Kingdom, India, Canada, Pakistan and New Zealand are the first 
prior members and currently there are 26 members including non-
Commonwealth countries and countries in groups of ASEAN and SAARC (South 




aid from some other countries was identified but not recorded.   
The France and UK ranked behind the top donor, US. Both donors 
delivered their assistance through Foreign Exchange Operation Fund 
and to aid project annually. UK contributed to the commodity import 
while France remain its military mission (approved by the Geneva 
Accords 1954), culture mission and education. There were 300 French 
professors and teachers, 82 technical staffs working on various fields 
in Laos. 
Australian aid was channeled through Colombo Plan. It consisted of 
financial aid, material and equipment, and technical staffs working on 
agriculture, education and communication sectors. Furthermore, 
Australia also provided materials for mining industry. Israel had been 
active in management of farming demonstration and support Laotian in 
to carry out the program. Economic Cooperation for Asia and the Far 
East⑨ (ECAF) was one regional organization that United Nation used to 
channel its aid. Other regional organizations were World Health 
Organization, the Bureau of Technical Assistance Organization.    
4.2. Japanese Aid 
The end of WW2 lefts no choice to Japan but to sign the San Francisco 
Treaty in 1952 in order to be able to participate in international 
community again. Under this condition, Japan had to pay the reparation 
to the victimized counties. In Southeast Asia, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Burma and Vietnam were concluded in the list of the reparation. 
Physically and economically, Japan was damaged hard in the war. The 
reparation had definitely put a big burden on Japan in early post WW2. 
Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) ⑩  had estimated that around 42 
                                            
⑨ ECAF or UNESCAP was created in 1947. It is one of UN agency that 
supports economic cooperation and development among its members. 




percent of Japan’s national wealth was ruined during the war (Takagi, 
1995). During 1935-37, production from manufacturing sector had 
decreased to less than 10 percent on average. The inflation rose in 
fluctuation between 60% and 130% till early 1949. Fortunately, the US 
and its allied partners had helped reform and stabilize Japan’s socio-
economy. The implementation of the program had progressively 
recovered Japan’s economy. Significantly, the US’s special 
procurement on purchasing Japanese goods to serve US military during 
the Korean War had been a big push to the normalization of Japan’s 
economy. In terms of the reparation bill, Japan had applied a form of 
procurement in its exported goods and services to the recipients. This 
pattern, so that, had turned Japan’s burden into opportunity as this tied 
export had encouraged and supported Japan’s domestic production of 
goods and services to expand its international market to those 
countries. Since mid1950s, this kind of Japan’s aid has been distributed 
to Southeast Asia. The relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia 
has been economically and politically developed afterward. 
Laos was not on the reparation list, but it is listed as economic aid 
recipient. Laos got economic and technical cooperation from Japan’s 
government in 1958 costing US$ 2.7 million. This could be recognized 
as the first official foreign assistance from the Japan to Laos since their 
established diplomacy relationship in 1955, which is approximately ten 
years after the invasion of Japan’s empire. With the establishment of 
OECD, the ODA from Japan to Laos can be seen in its database since 
1960 with the amount of around US$ 0.8 million. The aid had been 
growing dramatically year by year then. In 1975, the communist was 
                                                                                                        
that its economic policy could not be well implemented through Japanese 
government agencies, it then established Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) in 
1946 to help the recovery of Japanese economy. SCAP exercised indirectly 






successful in occupying Laos, and declared independency as Lao 
People Democratic Republic. The volume of Japan’s aid and other DAC 
donors to Laos had been significantly decreased.  
Figure 4: Japanese War Reparation and Assistance 
 
Source: Furuoka (2007) 
There were various fields of Japanese project aid provided to Laos 
since 1958. The first projects were the construction of a power plant 
with three thermal generators, a filtration plant and water distribution 
system for Vientiane, the capital of Laos. By 1964, the projects were 
completed. Next, technical and financial aid was allocated to the 
construction of Nam Ngum 1 Hydropower Dam, which was the biggest 




program was the expansion of the runway of national airport 
“Vientiane’s Wattay Airport”The length was extended to 3.700 yards. 
Other programs were mineral surveys, the financial and managing of 
demonstration farm, and the construction of primary school and 
dispensaries. 
Nam Ngum 1 Hydropower Plant is the first hydropower plant of Laos 
constructed on the Num Ngumriver about 60 km north of Vientiane 
capital of Lao PDR. Then the following decades, more dams were built 
along this river. The construction of the dam was on the national 
development plan which aimed at producing and serving electricity for 
domestic consumption and export to neighboring countries mainly 
Thailand. Additionally, the plant could provide flood mitigation and 
irrigation benefits to the local people who live in the area. The fund for 
the construction was assisted by ten countries including Japan and 
under the supervision of Mekong Commission and United Nations. This 
dam construction was carried out by Japanese company and completed 
in 1971. The dam has electricity production capacity of 150 Mega Watt 




Chapter 5. The Critical Falling of Foreign Aid 
(1975-1992) 
5.1. Decline of Aid Flow 
From 1975, Laos witnessed a sharp fall of overall foreign aid from its 
DAC donors, including important donor Japan. This is the significant 
drop of foreign assistance to Laos who at that time newly declared its 
independency under communist regime. The total volume of aid fell 
down by more than by 73 percent within 4 years, from 306 to 72 
million US$ during 1973 and 1977. The lowest point was in 1984 when 
its overall bilateral aid received was at around 37 million. The 
extraordinary decline was in 1980 when there was convergent 
deduction of foreign aid. The aid from each donor was not more than 5 
million. Then some donors had stopped giving assistance to Laos such 
as US, UK and Germany. During the period of 1950s-1960s, US had 
been the top donor. Its aid volume was sky-high further than other 
donors. Its aid then reduced critically during 1971 before the 
independence of Laos. It was until 1984 when many donors began to 
raise their aid to Laos again and the flow dramatically rise.  
Japan’s ODA to Laos was officially recorded since late 1950s, short 
time after diplomatic foundation. The volume of aid at the beginning 
was relatively small. Then the figure had risen up over 20 million 
US$ since 1966. It was until 1976 where the aid had been reduced 
dramatically under 20 million US$. The decline was in line with other 
DAC assistance. Its lowest was in 1980 as the amount was around 
US$ 4 million. The trend then fluctuated positively and could reach its 
US$ 20 million in 1992 when the Soviet Union collapsed signaling the 




Figure 5: DAC ODA to Laos 
 




5.2. Causes of Aid Deduction 
As mentioned in the methodology, the main assumptions of the 
deduction: economic interest and politic-security interest will be 
proved. The term economic interest will cover factors like the trade 
and investment, the ODA policy to Laos. The other part is Lao foreign 
policy and the politic ideology influence to be explored. This paper 
focuses on the intervention of other allied countries in Laos that could 
push Japan’s aid interest away from Laos.  In this part, the domination 
of most socialist countries, USSR, Vietnam and China are to be 
analyzed. 
5.2.1. Japan’s Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy 
With the uncertainty of the world situation especially in East Asia 
where there is diffusion of Cold War, oil stuck, the collapse of Soviet 
Union and globalization trends, many of East Asian countries found it 
hard to shape their foreign policy. Japan was one of those whose 
foreign interaction and policy were influenced by those multi-situations. 
For Japan, it faced at least three factors in building its foreign policy. 
One is from the dominant of US military in the region. As Japan is US’s 
allied, the policy is required not to pose any threat to this relationship. 
Two, Japan has historical debt of its WW2 incident to be paid off. Three 
is the desire of East Asian countries in their access of globalization, 
(Inoguchi, 1992). As a result, Japan’s business and foreign policy has 
been shaped by those factors which aiming at solving the constraint of 
its rising political and military supper-powered country. Japan, so that, 
regards market center as its strategy in implementing its business and 
foreign activities. Market is the main force while government is the 
secondary power in achieving objectives. Japanese foreign policy, so 
that, is structured by foreign trade, foreign direct investment, official 




domestic activities between Japan and other countries in East Asia. 
Japan gains dominance in the region through it simplification of foreign 
trade which leans on economics and industry competitiveness as 
drivers.   
Hook (1998) leant that prior 1989, Japan foreign aid served two main 
national strategies: reparation payment and economic strategy “guided 
capitalism”. The reparation focused on reestablishing the regional 
economic structure of Southeast Asia especially the countries whose 
were severely damaged by Japan during the war. Japan was an aid 
recipient at the end of WW2 and during late 1950s it began paying the 
reparation to Southeast Asian victims. The reparation was also aiming 
at building friendship relation for its potential economic cooperation 
with those nations. Japan began providing economic and technical 
cooperation to members of British Commonwealth when it joined 
Colombo Plan in 1954. As the stronger economic growth, Japan’s aid 
has been growing both in terms of diversity and volume of aid. In a 
book published in 1978 by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, it claimed 
the two importance of its economic cooperation that: 
1. The only path that allows Japan moving to prosperity and 
secured is the peaceful and stable world. And foreign 
assistance to developing countries is one of the most 
appropriate inputs that Japan can contribute.  
2. Trading with developing countries is the only way to secure 
Japan’s natural resources for its economic growth. 
Therefore, Japan is supposed to maintain good relationship 
with those countries.  
The Japan’s macro-economic strategy“guided capitalism” was 
accelerated mainly by its foreign aid flows to developing countries. In 




most bargaining economic sectors and promoted them through trade 
protection, think-thank subsidies, tax credits and the supported the 
national savings. Aid flow was set to pave the path for Japanese 
outbound FDI and build its trade networks. The aid was also allocated 
to the states that possessed raw materials which Japan saw it as 
important to its economic security. Many of projects were tied directly 
or partially to Japanese provision of goods and services. This kind of 
“tied aid⑪” so that encouraged Japanese local productions, and at the 
same time, fueled the economy of recipient countries.  Japan had 
showed its true-positive intention in engaging its diplomacy to Asian 
particularly ASEAN community. Japan Premier Fukuda made a round-
table conference among ASEAN members in 1977. In the round-table, 
he demonstrated the will of Japan toward ASEAN that based on four 
significant disciplines: (1) Japan promise not to pursue being the super 
powered military state, (2) establishing mutual trust between Japan and 
ASEAN, (3) the stronger cooperation of the two parties and (4) Japan 
support the self-reliance economics of each ASEAN member, (Araki, 
2007).     
5.2.2. Japanese FDI  
Japan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) can be tracked since the early 
post WW2 during 1950s and it was assumed to be coincident with the 
emergence of its ODA. The volume of its FDI to the world was 
relatively small up to 1970s. The net figure ranged from US$ 200-300 
million with limited industrial sectors in 1960. In a period of 1951-1985, 
the proportion of ASEAN covered 13.4 percent of total Japan’s outward 
FDI while the largest was North America covering 32.2 percent, 
(Komiya et, 1991).  
 
                                            
⑪ A form of offering aid with the condition that the recipient choice of buying 




Figure 6: Japanese FDI in ASEAN 
 
Source: Hiley (1999) 
For ASEAN region, Japanese FDI has been increasing dramatically from 
1970 and high-sky rose in late 1980s. By 1994, its total FDI in the area 
reached around 500,000 million Japanese yen which it used to stood at 
around 40,000 million in 1970, (Hiley, 1999).  
After turning from centralize plan economy to market led economy, FDI 
in Laos was still fairly small. In 1988, the total inflow FDI was US$ 2.7 
million and it was the first year of implementing a law on foreign direct 
investment of Laos. In 1992, Japan FDI in Laos was US$ 0.7 million and 
fluctuated to US$ 2.0 million in 1998 and ranked behind the top 10th 
investors. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, United State and Taiwan 
placed the top investor respectively, (Freeman, 2001). According to 
Kyophilavong (2009), during period of 1989-2008, the total Japanese 
FDI in Laos was US$ 28.9 million, equaled only 0.3%, covered 50 
projects and ranked the 16th top investor while the biggest was 




in 333 projects in the same period of time. If we compare Japan’s FDI 
and foreign aid trend to Laos, we can see the divergence. Japan’s FDI 
is in the decline trend while its foreign aid is on the rise.  
Figure 7: FDI in Laos 
 
Source: Freeman (2001) 
5.2.3. Lao Foreign Trade and Japan 
The Geneva Accord had set Laos free from external invasion 1954. 
Many foreing troops especially France had moved away from Lao 
territory. Lao had no external security entervention, but it faced 
internal security concern. The country could not agree on who should 
have the legistimacy of governing the country. The genaeral election 
was proposed but it could not solve the conflict. The were two 
prominent groups confronting, as mentioned, each other at that time. 
Pathet Lao, communist ideal, was opposing the traditional ruling Royal 
Lao Gevernment (RLG). The conflicts ended up obvously in 1971 with 




city area along Mekong river which covers one third of Lao landscape 
was under the adminitstratio of RLG. The area inhabited by two third of 
Lao population. The rest of Lao land which almost is mountainous areas 
in the was under the control of Pathet Lao. The two administry rulers 
had made Laos economic two different systems reflecting its devided 
states. The economy of each could survive or even make some 
respective progress due to the assistance of external source. The 
external source was mainly financing source commitment from big 
donors like US for RLG and Vietnam for Pathet Lao. The big donors are 
not only the donors of both Lao governing regimes but also their key 
trade partners.  
Both controled areas faced the same problem of internal transportation. 
The lack of good transportation was the serious hindrant of economic 
development. The flow of good and service was difficult and it could 
discourage production as well. With the insuficant of local production 
that can not feed the local need, the improvement and security of 
economy of both zones were deeply dependent on external subsistance 
of commodity.  
While little information on trade and transportation was available for 
area under control of Pathet Lao, the import of RLG was identical 
mainly from non-communist countries. The foreign trade and customs 
was controlled by France during the colonization and the trade deficit 
was balanced by its colonial budget. But during RLG ruling, the import 
value was annually outweighing its export causing deficit. Fortunately, 







Figure 8: Import of RLG by Country 
Imports of the Royal Lao Government Area, by Country of Origin 
         (in millions of kip) 
Country 1966 1967 1968 
Thailand 3,388.2 3,318.9 3,349.7 
Japan 1,276.8 1,891.8 2,750.2 
United State 1,392.5 1,761.8 1,763.2 
Indonesia 507.3 1,132.4 444.4 
France 475.6 631.2 970.3 
Singapore 146.7 540.8 462.8 
United Kingdom 806.6 535.5 913.4 
West Germany 305.9 337.7 328.7 
Other 1,717.5 1,646.2 1,895.6 
Total 10,017.1 11,796.3 12,878.6 
240 kip = US$ 1, according to the official rate   
 
Source: Whitaker et al (1972) 
Laos faced a number of fundamental obstacles in its foreign trade. 
Being a land-locked country has made Laos very difficult in trading 
with other countries beyond its neighbors. Having no seaport, 
international commerce must be done through its neighbors. This took 
more time and caused more money for those additional transports. In 
early 1970s, most of the import to RLG was through Thailand as other 
routes were closed due to the risk of unrest and conflicts in Laos. 
Thailand who was Lao neighboring country was the main importers. Its 
geographic location had enabled both states to trade easier compare 
with other countries. During 1966-68, the top importer to RLG was 
Thailand followed by US and Japan respectively. The trend of the total 
import to Laos was rising dramatically, from 10,000 million kip in 1966 




agricultural, road transportation, mineral and food products were the 
major proportion of import. The import of Japanese products was 
textile clothing and other consumer goods. The main destination of RLG 
export was Singapore and Malaysia, covering 60% on average, and 
Thailand, covering 30% on average.   
The source from UNCOMTRADE and OECD shows the trend of Japan 
export and ODA to Laos and import from Laos had some kind of 
correlation. The tree trends parallel movement of increasing from 1988 
to 1994. The import from Laos was at its highest in that year, around 
US$ 130 million before it had been on steady decline until 2005. The 
import value was around US$ 30 million, similar amount in the year 
1988. The export to Laos was on the declined parallel with import from 
Laos again from 1997 till 2004.  
Figure 9: Japan-Lao Trade and ODA 
 






Figure 10: Lao Import by Country    
 
Source: OEC (2017) 
The OEC⑫ graph indicates that Thailand has been the top importer to 
Laos of all time from 1962 to post 2000. Its proportion ranged from at 
least 20% to almost 80%. At the same time, Japan imported to Laos for 
an average of 10%-20% from 1962 to 1992 and then its trend declined 
modestly. There was no outstanding fluctuation of Japanese import 
during the period its aid deduction. This can imply the low relation 
between Japanese foreign aid and export to Laos during late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
5.2.4. Beginning of Lao PDR and the Move to Socialism 
In 1975, the military battle of Western and Communist bloc in Indochina 
had ended with communists gaining victories in Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos. The monarchic government was abolished and Lao People 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) was established under the leader and 
                                            
⑫ OEC is the internet platform that serves as a tool to report on the exchange 
of products between countries. It was Alexander Simore’s Master Thesis in 
Media Arts and Science at the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 





control of a single party system, namely Lao People‘s Revolution Party 
(LPRP). Even though the war was over, the rivalry strategy on gaining 
influence had kept on going and shifted from military to economic 
confrontation.  
Laos claimed new independence, its politics and economy still relies 
heavily on its powerful neighbors and donors. LPRP has historic 
relationship in struggling for independence with its comrade communist 
Vietnam and this tie continues to play significant influence in Lao 
governing. Lao politics still depends on Vietnam. In addition, Lao 
economy remains heavily independent on foreign assistance. In the 
early phase of restoring Lao economy, Laos faced high trade deficit as 
it used to before. Laos did not only need financial assistance, but also 
technical support. From 1975-79, as around 200,000 persons had fled 
the country for fear of communist persecution and most of them were 
well educated. This led Laos to experience brain drain incidence. 
Never the less, the previous wars had caused around one million 
Laotian or one third of Lao population to be displaced. This 
phenomenon had led to food crisis. In Vientiane alone, one third of its 
population was in starvation and so that dependent on foreign food aid 
which was mostly supported by US. The heavily bombed land had 
paralyzed the agricultural production which ending up to insufficient 
local food supply. And the new law promulgated by the Marxist regime 
had not encouraged local peasants to go back to their farmland and 
continue their farming routine as they used to do before.   
The overall economic condition got worst when the premier of Laos, 
Kaysone Phomvihan, reviewed Lao economic plan after one year in 
1977 and he gave a speech to public on priority of the country in the 
future. He emphasized that the country firstly to build socialist and 




urgently, Laos will make its economic condition that supports the 
government regime legitimacy. In the following year, the country, so 
that, applied collectivization scheme. The number of co-operative had 
obviously risen then. The co-operative agriculture campaign was one 
of the precondition in moving toward centralize “command” model of 
planning a long with Soviet line. Laos favors the ideology of Marxism 
and Leninism, this eco-politic ideology was applied in Lao government 
regime. Laos follows the path of socialism like its allies: USSR, China 
and Vietnam. Central planned economy was applied. Under the 
assistance of USSR and its allies, Laos implemented the collectivization 
policy on agriculture sector. Government controlled the local prices as 
well as the exchange rate which was determined regardless of the 
market system. By the implementation of socialist movement, most of 
foreign assistance from Western was interrupted. This had dramatically 
pushed Laos away from its Western friends mainly US, France and 
United Kingdom. After few years of central planned economy 
application, Laos experienced the stagnation of economic growth. 
5.2.5. Lao Foreign Policy 
Laos is a mall country located in the Southeast Asia, surrounding by big 
countries like China to its north, Thailand to its west, and Vietnam to 
its east. Others two neighbors are Cambodia and Myanmar. Due to its 
location, lied in the between bigger countries, it finds itself hard to 
shape its foreign policy since those countries have their competitive 
interests in Laos. Its past history recorded numbers of invasion from 
the neighbors, Thailand, Vietnam and China. Moreover, other major 
super-power empires like France and America made the last invasions 
record in modern history of Laos. The recent battle with American 
invasion was directly an effect of the Cold War, imperialism versus 





Laos made itself heard in 1945 as independent state from a long 
colonial rule of France, from 1893-1945. The country then found itself 
internal conflicts between the communist ideology and anti-communist 
ideology. Furthermore, there was minority insurgency who was seeking 
for their own independence namely “Hmong” tribe. Since Hmong 
insurgency was supported by foreign source, this played some role in 
the structure of foreign policy of Laos. The shape of foreign policy at 
the time was fruitful views and strategies of its competitive leadership, 
communist and non-communist leader groups who were on a race of 
pursuing their own views as the basis of national policy on foreign 
affairs.   
The country announced its independence again in 1975 under the 
regime of communist rule. Lao view of the world shares a lot of 
common with the view of Vietnam as a result of the dependency of 
Laos upon Vietnam within an Indochinese “unity bloc”. The view has 
been shaping its policy toward Laos‘ relations with its neighboring 
countries.  First, Lao claims to be neutralism apart from its close tied 
to socialist Vietnam. This claim was seen unrealistic since Laos is 
considered too weak to preserve its neutrality without the influence of 
Vietnam and Soviet. Geographic location has put Laos in a difficult 
position as of how to be in the middle of the confront interests between 
its neighbors; Vietnam from its east, China from its north and Thailand 
along the Mekong valley, from its west.  
The alternative is to have sufficient tie aligned with one neighboring 
state to prevent a de facto threat of the country division. The benefit of 
that prominent alignment would be the unity of the country 
administration, the possibility in forming up national unity and purpose 
among Lao diverse ethnic groups. However, the constraint derived 




absolutely or mainly under control of its protector. This fruitful 
situation leads to the status of losing nationality of Laos. So the 
determine of Lao fate depended on the country‘s leaders. How are they 
effectively exploiting the benefits of Laos‘ present reliance upon 
Vietnam and at the same time preventing the occurrence of the danger 
is the answer that shape the future of Laos. 
The global strategic environment also poses some kind of limitation to 
Lao foreign affair options. This global impact is worth to be explored, 
the major players driven the cold war, Soviet and America relationship 
to Laos. The relationship between America and Soviet Union has few 
direct impacts on Laos. Washington and Vientiane relationship is even 
though modest, it can be further developed into the path of negotiation 
between Washington and Hanoi where Laos can play the role as 
political bridge. Another actor that Laos must pay more attention is 
China. The relationship of Sino-US poses some level of threat that 
LPDR must take into account since both powerful countries historically 
were believed to support the insurgency group, Hmong, in Laos. So far, 
there is still no obvious evident showing the commitment of the two. 
However, Marxism-Leninism has shaped the ideology that never 
ceases the awareness of imperialism, US, who used to be (and always 
be) aggressive against communist.  
The Lao foreign policy faces other major challenge when it seeks to 
find its balanced position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The race of the 
two major powers has pushed Laos into difficult situation in showing its 
neutrality. There are so limited options for Lao foreign policies to be 
applied. The emergence of Soviet in Indochina has rose suspicions to 
China. China concerns about the strategic purpose of Soviet on the 
region as this could poses threat to China‘s strategy and its southern 




with Vietnam. Since the Vietnamese Communist Party ideology got 
influence from Soviet as well as the military support, this special 
relationship, Soviet-Vietnam, has determined China‘s attitude toward 
Soviet. Then in early 1979, the Chinese-Vietnamese War⑬ had proved 
that Lao ambition on its stand between the two sides had failed. 
Furthermore, Lao could not solve the problem of Kampuchea and 
Vietnam which Lao had no other choice but to side Vietnam. This 
implication had made the relationship of Sino-Laos worst. As Laos is 
independent on Soviet bloc aid and with the increasing influence of 
Soviet on Laos, this increases the likelihood of Chinese retaliation. 
Soviet-Lao relation has been in positive direction especially for Laos 
as Soviet has been supporting economic and military aid as well as 
technical assistance to Lao PDR. USSR planners took major part in the 
first five-year plan, for example. There have been some signs that 
Moscow was trying to make bilateral relationship with Vientiane which 
is not dependent on Soviet-Hanoi relationship. Furthermore, this 
relation does not hinder the Soviet-Vietnam tie.   
5.3. Communist Bloc Influence 
5.3.1. USSR Influence 
Motivation of Influence 
Earlier 1950s, Soviet did not have any interest in Laos. It began to pay 
attention to the fate of Laos in 1950s when Viet Minh ⑭  sought to 
eliminate French colonization out of all Indochina. The interest of 
Soviet in Vietnam gradually shifted to Laos since the widening in civil 
                                            
⑬ The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1998 caused anger to China. In 
response to the invasion, People Republic of China attacked Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam in early 1979. The fight took places along their border and lasted 
almost one month. This battle was also known as the Third Indochinese War. 
⑭ Viet Minh was a communist organization established in early 1940s by a 
Vietnamese; Ho Chi Minh. The task of Viet Minh was to liberate Vietnam from 




war in Laos and the emergence of organizational the “Pathet Lao”, a 
communist force. This activist resistance attracted more involvement 
of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and, therefore, the intervention of 
US Army. Soviet began practicing its strategy in Laos by indirect 
supporting the Communist movement in Vietnam followed by its direct 
military intervention into inner struggle of Laos.  Russia and Laos 
formed their diplomatic relations in late 1960, formerly USSR and the 
Kingdom of Laos. At that time, Soviet Union (Russia) leaders did not 
consider Southeast Asia as import to Soviet. However, the area could 
serve other strategic interests for Soviet. According to Langer (1972), 
there are four areas to be considered:  
1. It could be a guard in maintaining the influence of China in 
the region.  
2. It can reduce dependency of those governments on US.  
3. It could promote the trust in Soviet Union and the 
environment that the region independency is affordable under 
the help of Soviet‘s umbrella without the support of US or 
China.  
4. It could discourage the regional revolution resorted to Mao‘s 
strategy. 
At first, Soviet did not consider Laos as significant of Soviet‘s security, 
so it did not invest much to achieve those strategies.  But this 
perception was changed since its confrontation with China got worse. 
Now Soviet turned to pay more attention to the issue of Laos and began 
to invest more. At this point, the main focus of Soviet in Laos was 
prioritized to protect Laos from the reoccupation of Chinese communist. 
This desire had contributed to the shaping of Soviet behavior in Laos. 
Since the Asian revolutionary movement was prone to be reliant on 
Mao‘s strategy that would hinder the ideological leadership of Moscow, 




this threat. It also reduces the chance of confrontation of Soviet‘s 
military and US‘s military in the area where US military has more 
advantage from its influential power Southeast Asia. The aid from both 
China and USSR, then, was on a race to Laos in a hope of gaining 
favored ideology influence. But in the field, their real opponent was US 
who was expanding power in Indochina and also in Laos.     
Soviet Assistance  
In 1960, USSR began its indirect involvement in Laos through joining 
the military struggle of both anti-communist group (RLG) and neutral-
communist force (Pathet Lao) by implication of providing foreign aid. 
This implication was aiming at barring Laos from US expansion 
especially the RLG who was prone to be occupied by US. The Soviet 
support were mainly a large scale of military aid like weapons, 
ammunition, gasoline, and other stuff necessary for its anti-US 
campaign. The USSR aid to Laos was in line with other aid campaign 
supporting other communist activities in Indochina. The motivation of 
supporting Laos was, then, gaining more recognition from higher USSR 
officers and Soviet authors as it has always been quoted, Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister G. M. Pushkin’s remark to Ambassador Averell 
Harriman⑮ that “apart from the second World War, this was the highest 
priority Soviet supply operation since the Revolution”. As time passed, 
the presence of Soviet-US race over Laos got tougher and so that 





                                            
⑮ Averell Harriman used to worked as an American ambassador in Soviet 
Union in 1943, and in 1963 he was appointed to be special ambassador in 




Figure 11: The Foreign Aid to Laos in Early Independence 
 
Source: Arndt (1992) 
By early 1961, Soviet offered economic and technical support to the 
leader of RLG in a coalition with Pathet Lao. The aid covered wide 
range of field such as agriculture, natural resources, development of 
transportation, health care service, education and cultural exchange. 
The supply also included the presence of 500 Soviet personnel 
stationing in the northern parts of Laos. In 1962, Soviet aid to Laos got 
more advantages as the implementation of Geneva Accord forced US to 
withdraw its military from Laos with the replacement by the Soviet 
troops. Soviet could deliver more aid to RLG. 
Unfortunately, one year later, there was a bigger conflict between 
Pathet Lao and RLG. Their confrontation got worst and they turned 
their back to each other. At that time, North Vietnam Troop reentered 
and civil unrest in Laos burst out. This was the critical turn that pushed 




its aid to Pathet Lao while aid to RLG was quitted in 1963. Due to the 
distance from USSR to Laos, aid from USSR was delivered through the 
north of Vietnam by ship and then passed to the northern part of Laos. 
This made the aid programs to Laos and Vietnam was related as 
Vietnam also received aid from Soviet. The direct contribution of USSR 
military aid to communist Laos obviously infringed the Geneva Accords. 
1978 marked the start of socialist approach of strategic aid to Laos. 
The meeting of delegation from Council for Mutual Economic 
Association (CMEA⑯) led to the agreement on technical assistance from 
USSR and other socialist countries to Laos. By mid of 1978, it was 
estimated that there were around 2,000 Soviet and East European 
advisors in Laos. The Soviet economic and technical assistance 
programs to Laos prior to 1974 rated as small in scale and value and 
spasmodic affair. In early 1974, the Provisional Government of National 
Unity was established with the proclaimed of the Lao People 
Democratic Republic in late 1975 has led to the increase in Soviet aid 
to Laos. For instance, an agreement on concluded on November 20, 
1978, arranged for the USSR to procure free aid to the population of 
Laos affected by flooding through shipment of medicines, foodstuff and 
consumer goods. In terms of technical assistance, more than 250 
Laotian youths was been granted and studying in the higher and 
intermediate educational institution of the USSR in 1976. Around 100 of 
students, after graduating, they came back to work in agricultural and 
industrial sectors in Laos. By 1978, the number raised up to 500, then 
                                            
⑯ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) was 
established in 1949 by the agreement among Soviet Union, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. The purpose of this organization was 
based on political and economical reasons. It was aimed in respond to the 
Marshal Plan led by major capitalist America. CMEA can protect some Eastern 
European countries who were prone to be dominated by US. MEA aims at 
enhancing enable its members in exchange economic experiences, extend its 





reached 1,700 in 1980 and 1,800 in 1981. Meantime, thousands of 
Laotian was undergoing training on the job in Laos under the 
supervision of around 1,500 Russian technical experts stationed in Lao. 
5.3.2. Vietnam’s Influence 
Lao and Vietnamese relationship can be tracked back to 1930s as the 
Lao revolutionary struggle correlated revolutionary events in Vietnam. 
During its independent struggling over 30 years till 1975, Vietnam has 
provided aid and advised to Laos that help the current government 
regime seizing power. During that period, Hanoi had exercised a 
controlling influence over the Lao communist movement. Reaching 
political and military consensus, Vietnam Labor Party and Lao 
Revolutionary Party advocated independence and socialism to lead 
their revolutionary to success. Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation, therefore, was formed in 1977 to mark their political 
tie. This had paved the path for Vietnam in influencing in all levels of 
politics as well as economic affairs in Laos. In the interview with 
Japanese journalist in 1979, Lao premier Kaysone emphasized that: 
“In face of the threat of aggression by big nation expansionist 
hegemonism and imperialism, on basis of the said treaty and at 
the request of the Lao Government, the two governments have 
agreed to the present of Vietnamese army force in Laos in 
order to join the Lao army force in opposing the threat and 
sabotage against Laos. This is the legitimate measure jointly 
taken by the two sovereign arms at defending the sovereignty, 
independence, territory integrity and economic and culture 
construction in each country. This is also a normal practice in 
international relations” (Dommen, 1979). 
The treaty of special relationship has marked one step of the long-




its puppet. During the second Indochina War, North Vietnam obtained 
the cooperation of Lao People Revolution Party in reconstructing and 
maintaining Hoh Chi Min Trail and then they both built communication 
network road that passes through the length of Laos, which then has 
become the national road. During the construction of the road, a lot of 
Vietnamese workers were working in Laos as main labor. Thousands of 
Vietnamese troops were stationing along the road to maintain the road 
network and provide security. From 1962, Vietnamese troops got 
authority of exercise freely in the eastern of Laos. Since the victory of 
communist in 1975, the Vietnam troops had more authority to operate 
in Laos especially in the northern area of the country. The Vietnamese 
military stationing in Laos served as the store place and the support of 
Hanoi in invasion of Cambodia. Nevertheless, it served as good guard 
against Chinese influence in Laos. The Vietnamese government’s 
hegemony strategy was first to isolate Chinese government by seizing 
Laos and make Laos as its puppet to move Laos away from China’s 
domination. This goal was in line with Moscow’s strategy in eliminating 
China’s hegemony away from Southeast Asia. The presence of Vietnam 
troops at that time was obviously not on the purpose of defending Lao 
economic security, culture degradation and sovereignty, but to serve 
the greater of Vietnam in the lens of Ho Chi Min’s successor and this 
vision was mainly supported by Soviet bloc.   
The influence of Vietnam is not limited only in its troops present in 
Laos, but also in all level of politics. Many leaders were dominated by 
the political ideal of Marxism advocated by Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV). The treaty has allowed many technical staffs from 
Vietnam to station in many offices of Lao government to provide 
technical assistance such as providing suggestions on economic and 
technological development. All level of Lao authority was under the 




military exercise. The Lao political position on Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia was the critical event that reflected how much Vietnam can 
have an influence on Lao government. The communist tie between 
LPRP and CPV had mad other countries’ perception on Laos negative. 
Lao PDR is considered as a satellite of Vietnam.  
5.3.3. Chinese Influence 
People Republic of China formalized diplomatic relationship with The 
Kingdom of Laos in 1961. The Geneva, international settlement, in the 
following year has made Laos the neutral country. Both governments 
have reached many agreements in projects of building many roads 
linking southern parts of China to the northern parts of Laos. The 
Chinese labor working on the road construction sites was estimated to 
reach fifteen thousand. The relation got worst in 1977 when Vietnam 
had invaded Cambodia, and Laos was identified as siding Vietnam. 
China and Vietnamese relation at that time was obviously worst. Many 
of Chinese labors so that left Laos for their home. This reaction had 
obviously indicated that the agreement in building roads in Laos by 
China was based on its strategic interest of making Laos as Chinese 
access to mainland Southeast Asia. Other cause of tension was from 
the allegation of China in supporting anti-Laos minority group, namely 
Hmong living in Lao territory. The allegation took place when Vang Pao, 
the leader of Hmong, paid a secret visit to Beijing in 1977. At that time 
China was alert in employing Chinese Hmong clan in its southern parts 
to collaborate and commit activities in Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Lao 
borders .In 1979 Lao government learnt that the Chinese was on its 
progress in strategy of shaping Hmong’s ideology into opposing 
Vietnamese“hegemony” in Indochina, and on the other hand opposing 
Soviet“Socialist Imperialism”. Finally, the hypothesis that China 
preferred to create the “Hmong Kingdom” in Laos would become true. 




clansmen who believed of the return of their messiah. As a 
consequence, the Lao government was aware of this threat and be 
more skeptical about Sino-Lao relationship during that period of time.  
The normalization of China-Laos took place again in 1989 when the 
leaders of Laos paid a visit to the Beijing, China. This was the first visit 
after a few months of the Tiananmen⑰ incident. The relation, then, has 
been strengthened. China had assisted Laos during the Asian financial 
crisis. There was a signing on long-term cooperation. In 1991, the two 
had set a joint border commission and the formal treaty on border was 
signed in the following year. In 2006, Vietnam, China and Laos could 
approve the tri-border junction scheme.  
                                            
⑰ A mass protest leading by students in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square since April 
1989 recalling Chinese reform due to the economic stagnation and the lack of 
politic transparency. On the night of 3-4 June, People Revolution Army stormed 





Chapter 6. The Aid Flow Normalization 
(1993-2015) 
6.1. Aid Flow Recovery  
In 1980, Laos witnessed its lowest amount of foreign aid received. 
Since 1960s the total amount of foreign aid from DAC to the country 
was more than 200 million US dollars. The trend obviously was on the 
decline since the new foundation Laos under the socialist regime. The 
aid from Japan was on the down moved at the same period as other 
donors. The lowest trend stopped in 1980 where Japanese aid was 
disbursement was only 2.5 million US$. The DAC aid then on the 
recover and rise dramatically to the normal stable volume since 2000. 
By 2015, the net figure of aid from DAC was around US$ 348 million. 
This number is however smaller than the number in the late 1960s 
where the peak was almost US$ 350 million in 1967. 
From the dramatically recover and increase of Japan’s aid, two 
important moves were noticeable. The first big increase of Japan aid 
was during the start of NEM in Laos. The aid received in 1985 
increased by 4 time of 1984, from 3.2 million to 24 million 
US$ disbursement, while the total aid number increase fairly little, 
according to OECD database. The similar result appeared in the 
research by Suzuki in 1994 that the amount of Japanese aid 
commitment rose sharply during the beginning of Lao NEM. It 
increased by at least 3 time compare to the prior years. This has 
reflected some coloration or link between the recipient economy and 
the strategic interest of the donor. The second big positive jump of the 
aid was since the end of cold war. Starting from around US$ 30 million 
in 1993, it instantly rose and reached US$ 65 million in 1995. It drove 




of US$ 108 million in 1999 which was three time of aid in 1993.  
Figure 12: ODA to Laos after the Cold War 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
Since 2000, we have witnessed the fluctuated of the aid. 2011 was 
seen the lowest year of the aid trend with the number of around 34 
million US$. The aid has recovered again then to almost 100 US$ in 
2015. When we compare the total share of aid volume delivered to 
Laos, Japan ranked the biggest donor among DAC as its share of total 
aid covered at least one third of the all ODA to Laos.  
6.2. Sector Distribution 
The aid from Japan has been distributed to varied sectors. The main 
sector provided was economic infrastructure and services where its 
total volume of 20 years reached 652,642 million US$ that makes a 
share of 44%. The second one is social infrastructure and services with 






Figure 13: Share of Japanese ODA Sector Commitment (1)   
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
In economic infrastructure & services sector, the main projects were 
on road transport. The construction of bridges on the National Road 
No13 was one of those. It costed around 40,523 mil US$ in 1998. 
Earlier in 1997, approximately 38,542 mil US$ ODA grant was given to 
build a bridge in one big city, southern part of Laos. Other big projects 
were the construction of 2nd Mekong bridge loan from JBIC costing 
27,756 million US$. National Road No 9 had been improved through 
Japan’s grant in 2001 and 2011, with amount of US$ 27,714 million and 
US$27,260 million respectively. Other important assistance for Laos 
was the grant in expansion of Vientiane International Airport in 2011, 
of which valued US$ 16,329 million. And the recent major loan was 
Num Ngum1 Hydropower Station Expansion Project, valued US$ 39,644 








Figure 14: Share of Japanese ODA Sector Commitment (2) 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
For social infrastructure and services, the largest field was education, 
followed by government & civil society, water supply & sanitation, 
health and population policy/programs & reproductive health 
respectively. Some of the biggest projects were projects development 
of ground water in the south of Laos in 1998 and 2001 costing around 
US$ 10 million of grant aid. These projects are bigger in size compare 
with education field which varied in many more projects with small 




Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
Japan has been providing foreign aid to Laos since late 1950s. The aid 
is channeled through grant, loan and technical assistance. The volume 
of Japan’s bilateral aid has become the biggest to Laos since 2000. 
Japanese aid has played important role in Lao development consensus. 
Its project aid has contributed to the economic growth of Laos. For 
example, the aid plays important role in boosting Lao social 
infrastructure and economic infrastructure. Many big projects were 
supported by Japan’s aid, such as the hydropower dams, the expansion 
of Lao airport, national roads and so on. It turns out to the increase in 
the Lao GDP per capita from US$ 300 in 2000 to US$ 1500 in 2015. 
The economic growth rate has been not less 7% per year since 2010.    
Laos has become much dependent on foreign aid since its early 
independence in 1945. The French colonization left Laos poor 
economic condition; furthermore, the internal conflict has pushed Laos 
more into poverty and least developed state. A lot of foreign aid has 
been given to Laos then. At that time, Laos was internationally 
recognized as a country under the governing of Royal Lao Government 
(RLG) while Pathet Lao was regarded as government opponent group. 
So, most aid was given to RLG. US had been the major donor for Royal 
Lao Government meanwhile Pathet Lao received foreign aid from 
mainly Soviet Union. Vietnam and sometime China were reported as 
modest donors. Before 1975, the given aid was mainly aiming at 
supporting military expense and economy development. After Pathet 
Lao gain victory in occupying Laos in 1975, Laos has turned to 
communist ruling regime and ending royal governing. From that critical 
point, the Marx-Lenin economic pattern has been applied in Laos. New 
Laos turned its back to Western and imperial partners and favor more 




flow in this turning period had fallen down sharply to its lowest in 1980. 
It was until the end of Cold War that the aid could resume to its normal 
revel.  
This paper contents that Japanese foreign aid’s motivation during late 
cold war period had shifted from single economic interest to balance 
with regional security aspect. According to this paper analysis, both 
factors like economy and political security have contributed to the 
trend of Japanese aid flow to Laos. However, the more convincible 
reason or factor for the Japan’s foreign aid reduction during late 1970s 
was the politic-security concern issue and this factor also affected to 
all donors at that time resulting in their aid deduction coincidently. 
There are two political securities here to be mentioned. One is internal 
and another is external security.  
Internal security is the peace within Laos. Apart from the challenge of 
the settlement of the new government regime: the political and 
economic gear to socialism, Laos also encounters civil conflict. The 
Hmong guerrilla still activated to protest and claim for its own 
independence. Lao government was trying to eliminate the anti-
government activity and turn the perspective of the clans to possibility 
of unification. These people are also evidently to be supported by 
China. The traditional donors fear that the communist government will 
utilize the given aid into its military confrontation with the Hmong or 
other minority groups in Laos. This may lead to unexpected massacre 
incident. The aggressive of communist leader not only poses threat to 
its own citizens, but also to its neighboring country. The external 
security is related to the security of Lao neighboring countries 
especially Cambodia and the Sino-Lao relationship. The Lao movement 
in siding communist Vietnam in invading Cambodia has reduced the 




region did not agree with Vietnam in attacking Cambodia, except Laos. 
The atmosphere in Indochina peace at that time was so weak. 
Moreover, the tension between communist China and Vietnam also 
worsened the situation in Indochina scene. The more aid to Lao 
government may mean stronger communist troops and so that 
Indochina is more prone to another battlefield. Japan was one of those 
who fear the foreign aid would be used in contrast with donor goals, 
economic and security development of Laos, but threat to regional 
instability. 
Fortunately, after 1980, Japan began, as well as other donors, have 
resumed they aid to Laos. One of the reasons for that could be the 
improvement in Lao international policy and domestic policy. The 
economic-historic turning point in 1986 has made Lao economy 
impressively progressive. Laos has opened wider door for Japan and 
other western countries to increase economic tie with Laos. Other good 
environment for the normalizing of foreign aid is the end of Cold War. 
Since the Cold War is over, Laos experienced the increase of foreign 
aid. The bilateral aid flow from Japan has been on the stable trend and 
rank top donor since 2000. While the aid covers various sectors, 
economic and social infrastructure has been the main focus sector of 
aid.  
With regard to the analysis of this article, the information and data used 
in this paper is not sufficient while some maybe considered not 
valuable enough due to the constraint of historic-data available. For 
example: the data of Japan-Lao trade prior 1980 was very rare. We 
could not see exactly the density of the two countries’ trade. The 
detail in statistics of trade and FDI was insufficient. One barrier for the 
data validity is the internal conflict of the two major politic groups in 




collection not eligible of representing full detail of Laos. The main data 
available was from RLG zone while very few data from Pathet Lao was 
available. Furthermore, the Lao import by country data contained in 
this paper was only from only 3 years, 1966-68. The more importance 
should be the trade flow during the critical juncture of aid deduction 
period. In addition, the data on Japan FDI in Laos is also rare. Even the 
data shown in this paper that Japan FDI in Laos during 1990s was so 
modest, it would be more valuable if the data during 1970s and 1980s, 
the period of aid flow deduction, was available.  In this situation, it 
would be questionable for this paper to claim that the FDI and 
international trade between Japan and Laos play lesser role than other 
factors in influencing the aid flow from Japan to Laos during late 1970s 
when many scholars have academically illustrated that Japanese aid 
disbursement is based on its economic interest during its first aid 
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라오스는 인도차이나 반도에 위치한 빈곤국으로 1945년 독립 이후에 
지속적으로 대외원조에 의존해왔다. 일본이 1950년대 후반부터 라오스에 
원조를 제공해왔고 2000년부터 가장 큰 원조국이 되었다. 
본 논문은 라오스에 대한 일본의 원조 역사를 분석한다. 1970년대 
후반부터 1980년대 초반에 일본을 포함한 많은 원조국들이 라오스에 
제공하는 원조가 감소하였는데, 본 연구의 목적은 그 원인을 파악하는 
것이다. 일본의 대외원조정책, 일본과 라오스의 경제적·정치적 관계 그리고 
공산주의의 영향 등 다양한 변수를 살펴보았다. 이 연구에서 원조를 
제공하는데 있어 일본의 경제적 동기가 강조된다. 연구 결과, 원조가 
감소한 가장 주요 원인은 정치적 안보였던 것으로 나타났는데, 이는 
일본이 라오스와 주변국의 안보에 대한 우려가 높아졌었기 때문이다. 
라오스 내에서의 사회주의 운동과 1970년대에 공사주의 국가인 베트남과 
소련연방에 많은 영향을 받아 라오스의 경제, 민주주의, 인권과 
주변국과의 외교관계가 불안정해졌다. 또한, 라오스와 일본의 경제적 
유대가 강하지 않았기 때문에 일본이 원조를 감소시키는 원인으로 보기 
어려운 것으로 나타났다.  
주요어:   일본, 라오스, 대외원조, 대외원조의 동기, 대외원조 감소, 
정치안보 
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